Assentication: User Deauthentication and Lunchtime Attack Mitigation
  with Seated Posture Biometric by Kaczmarek, Tyler et al.
Assentication: User Deauthentication and Lunchtime
Attack Mitigation with Seated Posture Biometric
Tyler Kaczmarek
University of California, Irvine
tkaczmar@uci.edu
Ercan Ozturk
University of California, Irvine
ercano@uci.edu
Gene Tsudik
University of California, Irvine
gene.tsudik@uci.edu
Abstract—Biometric techniques are often used as an extra
security factor in authenticating human users. Numerous bio-
metrics have been proposed and evaluated, each with its own set
of benefits and pitfalls. Static biometrics (such as fingerprints) are
geared for discrete operation, to identify users, which typically
involves some user burden. Meanwhile, behavioral biometrics
(such as keystroke dynamics) are well-suited for continuous,
and sometimes more unobtrusive, operation. One important
application domain for biometrics is de-authentication: a means
of quickly detecting absence of a previously-authenticated user
and immediately terminating that user’s active secure sessions.
De-authentication is crucial for mitigating so-called Lunchtime
Attacks, whereby an insider adversary takes over (before any
inactivity timeout kicks in) authenticated state of a careless user
who walks away from her computer.
Motivated primarily by the need for an unobtrusive and
continuous biometric to support effective de-authentication, we
introduce PoPa – a new hybrid biometric based on a human
user’s seated posture pattern. PoPa captures a unique com-
bination of physiological and behavioral traits. We describe a
low-cost fully functioning prototype that involves an office chair
instrumented with 16 tiny pressure sensors. We also explore (via
user experiments) how PoPa can be used in a typical workplace
to provide continuous authentication (and de-authenication) of
users. We experimentally assess viability of PoPa in terms of
uniqueness by collecting and evaluating posture patterns of a
cohort of users. Results show that PoPa exhibits very low false
positive, and even lower false negative, rates. In particular, users
can be identified with, on average, 91.0% accuracy. Finally, we
compare pros and cons of PoPa with those of several prominent
biometric-based de-authentication techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION & MOTIVATION
Secure, correct and efficient user authentication is an in-
tegral component of any meaningful security system. Au-
thentication schemes implemented in a typical modern work-
place typically include two factors: (1) a user demonstrates
knowledge of a secret password or PIN, and (2) a user
proves possession of a secure device or token. However, it
is becoming more popular to augment this approach with a
third factor – biometrics that reflect inherent human traits or
behaviors. Biometric techniques are considered as the best
means of evaluating human inherence and they range widely:
from a very simple (e.g., fingerprints) to rather complex, such
as iris scans.
After initial authentication, users often spend long stretches
of time continuously using computing devices and services.
During that time, continuous presence of the originally au-
thenticated user must be periodically re-affirmed, especially,
in a shared workplace setting. Failure to do so can result in
so-called Lunchtime Attacks. Such an attack occurs when a
previously authenticated user walks away from her workplace,
thus allowing the adversary to take over her login session and
engage in potentially nefarious activity. This prompts the need
for periodic re-authentication and/or continuous authentica-
tion. Unfortunately, the former can be quite annoying, as is
the case with too-short inactivity time-outs requiring frequent
password re-entry.
Meanwhile, continuous authentication (or presence verifi-
cation) is challenging in its own right. For example, camera-
based methods that use face recognition [4] or gaze tracking
[7] might be viewed as intrusive in terms of personal privacy,
since cameras can be abused (e.g., by malware) to surrepti-
tiously record users. Furthermore, face recognition is prone
to attacks, while gaze tracking requires the user to maintain
line-of-sight with the camera, which can result in unnecessary
de-authentication when the user turns away, while remaining at
the workplace. Whereas, keyboard or mouse activity profiling
and monitoring, though effective in some settings, are poorly
suited for cases when a user temporarily halts input activity,
e.g., in order to chat with co-workers or answer the phone.
Other techniques continuously measure physical distance be-
tween the user and her workplace, by requiring each user to
wear an extra device, e.g., a wristband or smart badge. Such
methods are: (1) potentially burdensome due to imposing an
extra device, and (2) ultimately authenticate only the presence
of the device and not of its owner.
Based on the above discussion, we believe that the “de-
sign space” for continuous authentication (or, equivalently,
de-authentication) techniques needs to be explored further.
From the outset, we acknowledge that a perfect continuous
authentication method is unlikely to materialize; in fact, one
might not even exist. In other words, since each previous
method has a distinct set of advantages and limitations/flaws,
the same will certainly hold for our current efforts.
In this paper, we propose and evaluate a new biometric
called PoPa. It is based on a user’s seated posture patterns in
an average office chair over the course of a typical workday.
We explore two potential use cases for this new biometric.
First, we examine applicability of PoPa to continuous user
authentication, i.e., ensuring that – after the initial successful
login – the person currently using a particular computer is the
same as the one who initially logged in. One of PoPa’s key
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advantages over many other de-authentication methods is its
ability to operate in an unobtrusive manner, with no effort on
the part of the user.1
Second, we evaluate PoPa in the context of user identi-
fication. Unlike continuous authentication, user identification
does not involve as much disruption of normal user behavior.
However, it provides a different use-case for PoPa. While
continuous authentication requires periodic checks during a
given session, identification is typically established at session
initiation time and requires faster operation.
To evaluate its viability and effectiveness, we built a low-
cost PoPa prototype by instrumenting a commodity office
chair with ultra-thin flexible sensors that gather user posture
data. Its purpose was to assess whether users are correctly
authenticated, based on their own training data. The same
platform was used to test: (1) uniqueness of PoPa within
a sample population of measured users, and (2) its stability
over time, i.e., permanence. Our results demonstrate that
the prototype unobtrusively captures the necessary data for
continuous authentication and identification while the user
engages in a typical use of a desktop or laptop computer.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
overviews related work. Next, Section III provides the back-
ground on continuous authentication and de-authentication.
Section IV describes the PoPa biometric. Then, Section
V outlines the adversarial model, followed by Section VI
which compares several prominent biometric-based continu-
ous authentication methods. Section VII describes the PoPa
prototype and methodology used for data collection, followed
by results in Section VIII and a discussion of their implications
in Section IX. The paper concludes with future work directions
in Section X and a summary in Section XI.
II. RELATED WORK
Biometric traits have been extensively explored in the con-
text of authentication. Jain et al. [10] provides an authoritative
overview of many well-known techniques, including: finger-
print, face, iris, palm-print and keystroke dynamics. However,
since our focus is on biometric-based continuous authentica-
tion which can be used to achieve effective de-authentication,
we do not discuss methods that are not amenable for the
intended application.
Rasmussen et al. [16] use human body’s response to electric
signals as a biometric. In the proposed system, a weak pulse
signal is applied to the palm of one hand and measured on
the palm of the other hand. Pulse-response biometric can
be used as a second or third factor in user authentication
and/or as a continuous authentication mechanism. The system
achieves 100% accuracy over a static set, and 88% accuracy
on permanence tests performed over several weeks.
Eberz et al. [7] investigate eye movement patterns as a
biometric. Based on gazing data gathered from 30 participants,
pupil, temporal and spatial features are defined. Reported equal
1This is in contrast with, for example, fingerprint-based continuous authen-
tication, which would prompt the user to periodically swipe her finger(s) on
the fingerprint reader; which is obtrusive and disrupts the typical workflow.
error rate is 3.98% in a single session and 92.2% of attacks
are detected within 40 seconds. Measurements done two weeks
apart show that this biometric is stable over time.
Mare et al. [12] propose wearing a bracelet that has a
gyroscope and an accelerometer for continuous authentication.
When the user interacts with the computer (e.g., typing or
scrolling), the bracelet transfers collected sensor data to the
computer, which evaluates whether user actions match sensor
data. The proposed system, ZEBRA, achieves continuous
authentication with 85% accuracy and detects attacks within
11 seconds. However, a recent study by Huhta et al. [9]
presents a set of credible attacks on ZEBRA.
ECGs and EEGs have been used to construct continuous
authentication systems. [11] uses ECG and a novel feature
extraction method called One-Dimensional Multi-Resolution
Local Binary Patterns (1DMRLBP). Results show a false
positive rate of 0.39% and a false negative rate of 1.57%.
The system uses ECG data gathered mostly for medical
purposes and it is unclear how this data can be obtained in a
realistic environment. Also, Riera et al. [18] use both ECG and
EEG signals for continuous authentication, achieving a false
negative rate of 0.82% using a multistage fusion architecture
to combine authentication results from ECG and EEG signals.
In order to gather EEG signals, this system requires each user
to wear a special cap that covers the head.
Keystroke dynamics are another means of continuous au-
thentication. [2] uses 1, 500 digraphs from each user as a base
profile and applies neural networks to guess missing digraphs.
In a 53-user experiment, a false negative rate of 0.0152%, a
false positive rate of 4.82% and an equal error rate of 2.46%
are achieved.
Finally, Conti et al. [5] describe FADEWICH, a continuous
authentication system that uses attenuation of wireless signals
when a human body is on the signal’s path. FADEWICH is not
based on any biometrics. It tracks the user by placing 9 sensors
in a 6m-by-3m office environment. Once detected as having
left the environment, the user is logged out. FADEWICH
successfully de-authenticates users with 90% accuracy within
4 seconds, and 100% accuracy within 6 seconds.
There have been prior attempts to use posture and seated
pressure for both identification and continuous authentication.
Gia et al. [8] used data gathered from: (1) four pressure sensors
placed on the seat bottom, (2) an accelerometer, and (3) light
sensors placed on the seat-back, to identify the user. Pressure
sensors are used to differentiate among users, while weight
and accelerometer readings determine chair movements when
someone sits down. Also, light sensors determining how much
space is covered by the sitting user. In an experiment involving
only 10 people, a rather low accuracy of 72% is achieved.
Furthermore, Yamada et al. [22] described a hip-print au-
thentication method which uses pressure data from 32 sensors
placed along the seat bottom. Since any seated shift action
causes a short continuous change of pressure values, two
authentication methods are considered: one based on stable
state of pressure distributions, and another based on the
transient part. In an experiment with 12 participants, accuracy
of 96.3% is achieved for the former, and 92.9% – for the latter.
However, in experiments that use only first three pressure
measurements (1.5 seconds), quite low accuracies of 74.3%
and 59.9% are reported for 10 and 25 subjects, respectively.
Among prior work, the one closest to this paper is [17]. It
proposes a continuous driver identification system for automo-
biles that uses pressure data from two mats, each containing
32x32 sensors, placed on the seat cushion and backrest of
the driver seat. Features used for classification are based on
one’s pelvic bone signature, mid- to high-pressure distribution
and weight. In a study involving 34 participants, a fairly low
uniqueness rate is reported. The experiment was done using
only one posture, which makes it hard to identify posture
characteristics for different people. Moreover, a car setting
is not appropriate for detecting pressure distribution changes,
since most drivers adopt one constant posture adjusted to their
preferred driving position.
Finally, Mutlu et al. [15] investigated how to use fewer sen-
sors to detect posture. To determine optimal sensor placement,
a classifier is constructed that learns the probabilistic model
between the chosen subset of sensor values and feature vectors
used for posture classification. With 19 sensors, classification
accuracy of 87% is reported. As discussed later, this study
guides our sensor placement strategy.
III. BACKGROUND
This section sets the stage for the rest of the paper by
overviewing user authentication, de-authentication, attack sce-
narios and continuous authentication requirements.
A. User Authentication
User authentication can involve one or more of the following
factors:
F1: What one knows, or what one recognizes.
The former corresponds to knowledge of: passwords,
PINs, drawing patterns and free-text answers to security
questions. The latter corresponds to recognition of: cor-
rect answers to multiple-choice questions, faces or other
types of images.
F2: What one has in their possession.
This generally means some form of a personal (even
passive) device, such as a badge, bracelet, key-fob, token
or smartphone.
F3: What one is, or how one behaves.
The former type is referred to as a static and in-
cludes biometrics based on: fingerprints, irises, palms,
wrists, faces, ears and pulse-response. The latter type is
called behavioral and includes biometrics based on: gait,
keystroke dynamics, head movements, hand gestures and
gaze tracking.
Though widely used, F1-type authentication alone is widely
considered to be insufficient, mainly due to the low entropy
of secrets involved. By itself, F2 is also inadequate, since a
personal device is not guaranteed to always be in possession
of its intended owner. Finally, F3 can be subverted, at least
for some static methods, e.g., via cloned fingerprint moulds
[21], fake irises using contact lenses [3], and face masks [1].
It also often requires a non-trivial training or enrollment phase.
Meanwhile, some behavioral biometrics are unstable or fragile,
e.g., gait and head movements. Consequently, multi-factor user
authentication is usually recommended in order to achieve
better security.
B. De-Authentication & Lunchtime Attacks
As part of everyday office or workplace activity, an average
user might engage in one or more of the following activities
(not an exhaustive list):
[A1]: Work by continuously utilizing one or more traditional
input devices, such as a keyboard, touchscreen or mouse.
[A2]: Take a quick seated nap or meditation break.
[A3]: Read some printed matter, e.g., a paper or book.
[A4]: Use another personal device, e.g., a smartphone.
[A5]: Turn away from one’s desk to talk to other people
directly, or on the phone.
[A6]: Watch videos and/or listen to music without using any
input devices.
[A7]: Take part in an audio or video conference.
[A8]: Get up momentarily to fetch something from the imme-
diate vicinity (or simply to stretch) and return.
[A9]: Walk away from the workplace for a short (e.g, bath-
room), longer (e.g., lunch), or long (e.g., done for the
day) time, before returning.
In a security-conscious setting, these activities might require
periodic reassurance that the same user (who initially authen-
ticated and/or logged in) is still present. Ideally, when the
original user remains present [A1-A7], no reassurance should
be needed. However, [A9] results in leaving the workplace
unattended, while [A8] might. (Also, [A2] could be viewed
as the user not really being there.) An important challenge is
to distinguish among these types of activities. The term de-
authentication denotes the process of deciding whether the
original user is no longer present and, if so, terminating active
secure sessions.
In a perfect world, each user would always log out or
otherwise terminate all active sessions before stepping away.
Unfortunately, this is far from reality, which triggers the threat
of Lunchtime Attacks. As the name suggests, attack of this type
occurs when the adversary takes over the secure session(s) of a
legitimate user who has left, even for a short time. Such attacks
are quite common, as noted in the recent work of Marques et
al. [13].
C. Default Approach: Inactivity Timeouts
The most common current means of dealing with Lunchtime
Attacks and reassuring original user presence is inactivity
timeouts. Most users of personal and workplace computing
devices are familiar with them: whenever keyboard and/or
mouse inactivity exceeds a certain threshold, de-authentication
takes place, i.e., log-in and other (previously authenticated)
sessions are terminated. Various operating systems, apps and
websites set their own timeout rules and policies. In some
cases (e.g., macOS or Windows) users can select their own
timeouts. At a typical workplace, mandatory timeouts are often
imposed.
Saying that timeouts are unloved would be an understate-
ment. As noted in [12], most users find too-short timeouts an-
noying, while too-long timeouts are insecure, since they defeat
the purpose of Lunchtime Attack mitigation (by extending the
attack time window). Even more importantly, timeouts achieve
their desired effect only in case [A1] and fail in several other
ways:
• They operate under the assumption that keyboard/mouse
inactivity (i.e., ”NOT [A1]”) indicates user absence. This
is often not true, e.g., in cases [A2]-[A5] and [A8]. De-
authenticating the user in these cases is both unnecessary
and annoying.
• Conversely, timeouts naı¨vely suppose that resumption of
activity (within the timeout threshold) indicates presence
of the same user. This is clearly wrong in situations where
the original walks away [A9] and the adversary quickly
starts typing.
• In case [A6], if timeouts are activated, the user is also
unnecessarily burdened. Otherwise, if timeouts are auto-
matically disabled while music and/or videos are playing,
the user can walk away for a potentially long time,
thus leaving the computing device(s) open to Lunchtime
Attacks.
• The same holds for case [A7], except that user’s voice
and/or camera movements might be used to infer con-
tinuous presence. However, this would require additional
voice or visual authentication.
• In case [A9], timeouts only work correctly (by de-
authenticating the original user) if no attack occurs.
Knowing the timeout threshold, which is usually not
secret, allows the adversary to easily succeed in a
Lunchtime Attack.
D. Continuous Authentication
Given the inadequacy of inactivity timeouts, one appeal-
ing alternative is continuous authentication. Methods of this
variety are generally unobtrusive, i.e., require none or very
little user burden. As discussed in Section II, these include:
keystroke dynamics [2], wrist movement [12], pulse response
[16], gaze tracking [7], and wireless signal monitoring [5].
(Note that only the first four are biometric-based methods,
while the last is purely a de-authentication technique.)
Keystroke (and/or mouse) dynamics are an effective and
unobtrusive means of continuous authentication. An adversary
who steps in once the legitimate user leaves is likely to be
quickly detected. However, this method has the same pitfalls
as inactivity timeouts: [A2]-[A8] can be either interpreted as
user’s absence (which could be wrong) or as presence, which
could also be wrong if what actually occurred is [A9].
Wrist movement monitoring (e.g., using an accelerometer
and a gyroscope contained in a bracelet as in [12]) has much
the same flaws as keystroke dynamics. Moreover, recent results
[9] demonstrated a worrisome weakness of this approach.
Pulse response biometric [6], [16] measures human body
impedance, when subjected to a weak electrical signal. Ob-
taining measurements (hand-to-hand) requires closing a circuit
which can be attained when the user types with both hands
on conductive keyboard, uses both a keyboard and a mouse,
or otherwise touches a conductive surface with each hand.
Once again, the limitations are similar to those of keystroke
dynamics. (The only exception is that pulse response works
even if the user simply rests her hands on conductive surfaces
while not typing or moving the mouse).
Gaze tracking [7] is also partially effective. It operates
correctly, particularly in cases [A1], [A6] and [A7], as long
as the user looks in the general direction of the camera. The
same holds for [A9], and possibly [A8], as long as the gaze
tracking interruption threshold is set appropriately. However,
in cases [A2] and [A5], gaze tracking would incorrectly
de-authenticate the user. Directional (line-of-sight) nature of
gaze tracking complicates [A2], while [A5] is simply not
addressable. Whether gaze tracking works in [A3] and [A4]
also depends on whether line-of-sight is preserved.
Finally, the recent FADEWICH de-authentication technique
[5] requires instrumenting the single-user workspace with
multiple wireless devices that continuously measure WiFi
RSSI2 in order to detect whenever the user exits her work-
space. Since no external device is required, this places no
personal burden on the user. On the other hand, by monitoring
RSSI fluctuations, it is not possible to identify or authenticate
the user. Also, this method can produce incorrect results (both
false positives and false negatives) when multiple users are
present and one leaves.
E. Design Goals
Since our main goal is the design of a biometric-based de-
authentication method, we first consider general design goals
for biometrics. A popular survey of biometric techniques by
Jain, et. al [10] provides a comprehensive overview of many
popular methods, and discusses design criteria, which include
the following:
Universality: The biometric must be (ideally) universally
applicable. For example, an iris scanner is not useful for users
who are missing an eye or have cataracts, while fingerprint
readers are similarly useless for people with severe eczema.
Uniqueness: The biometric must be unique within the target
population. It must be possible to distinguish users using the
biometric.
Permanence: The biometric must remain consistent over the
intended use duration. Not all biometrics are truly constant
over a person’s entire adult lifetime.
Unobtrusiveness: The biometric should be maximally trans-
parent. Ideally, it should be used in a passive manner, without
any extra requirements or interference with users’ normal
behavior.
Circumvention Difficulty: To be meaningful in any security
context, the biometric must be difficult to circumvent. That is,
2RSSI: Received Signal Strength Indicator.
false positive (fraud) rate should be minimal, i.e., it should be
hard to impersonate a genuine user.
Low Error Rate: The biometric must have a low false
negative (insult) rate, i.e., should very rarely fail to recognize
an enrolled user.
Collectability: The biometric should be measurable in an
fast, easy and meaningful quantitative way.
Cost Effectiveness: The biometric’s distinguishing power as
related to the cost of deployment and maintenance. In our
design, this is a key goal.
Easy enrollment: The biometric’s initial (training) phase
should be as short and burden-free as possible.
Acceptability: The ideal biometric is one which (most) users
are comfortable to use.
We now present design goals for an ideal de-authentication
method, not necessarily based on biometrics.3
• Minimal extra components (particularly, physical or hard-
ware) and monetary cost
• Quick and correct detection of activities requiring de-
authentication, i.e., [A9] or a circumvention attempt, e.g.,
another user sits down
• Minimal false negative rate, i.e., probability of mistaking
[A1]-[A8] for [A9]
• Minimal false positive rate, i.e., probability of mistaking
[A9] for [A1]-[A8]
• Maximal user transparency, i.e., unobtrusiveness
We recognize that the last goal might be ethically dubious. De-
authentication methods with user transparency can be abused,
e.g., by unscrupulous employers, to surreptitiously spy on
unsuspecting users. We acknowledge that it is very difficult
to reconcile positive and negative connotations.
IV. PoPa BIOMETRIC
PoPa posture pattern biometric works by monitoring, over
time, changing pressure patterns exerted by a user seated
in a typical office chair. PoPa relies on a combination of
user behavioral patterns and physical characteristics. The latter
includes: hip width, spine length, leg length, torso width, as
well as overall weight. In addition, overall pressure distribution
and its shifts are determined by the user’s exact posture. Over
time, it changes in a way that is unique to each user and
that user’s emotive state. This behavioral characteristic is also
factored into PoPa.
A. Strengths & Weaknesses
Since exact distribution of seated pressure depends on the
user’s physical dimensions as well as on adopted postures,
PoPa is a hybrid biometric blending physiological and be-
havioral factors. This allows it to benefit from some strengths
of both. In particular, one’s posture pattern can be captured
in a strictly passive manner. Even though this property is
shared by other biometrics, such as facial recognition or
pulse response, posture pattern is not easily circumventable
(unlike, e.g., facial recognition), and does not alter normal
3We do this while keeping in mind that all of them are unlikely to be
achievable.
user behavior, unlike, e.g., pulse-response. We believe that this
combination of unobtrusiveness, difficulty of circumvention,
and behavior agnosticism make PoPa an attractive biometric.
However, posture pattern also inherits some weakness of
both types of biometrics. As in any physiological biometric, it
it impossible to capture one’s template (i.e., posture pattern)
without the use of hardware specifically instrumented for
this task. Fortunately, PoPa requires very little in terms of
specialized hardware. As discussed later in Section VII, we
constructed an PoPa prototype of an instrumented office
chair. Also, similar to many behavioral biometrics, perma-
nence of PoPa is not ideal. For example, a user who has
a leg, hip or lower-back injury might appreciably alter her
posture pattern.
B. Liveness & Replay
In any biometric system used for continuous authentication,
liveness detection is a serious concern. For example, a face
recognition system needs to detect blinking, breathing, and/or
some other artifact of a user being alive and present. Other-
wise, as has been demonstrated in the past, it can be subverted
by a photo or a mask (face-cast). Traditionally, liveness is
attained via some form of a challenge by the system that
requires the user to act. In case of facial recognition, the
system might prompt the user to turn her head or look in
a particular direction. While this helps achieve liveness and
protect against subversion, it also sacrifices transparency and
increases user burden.
Some modern de-authentication systems, such as gaze track-
ing or keystroke patterns, can passively check for liveness
by relying on dynamic user behavior instead of constant
physical characteristics. However, they require the user to act
in a particular (not necessarily free or natural) manner. For
example, gaze tracking requires the user to face in the general
direction of the gaze tracking apparatus, which may not always
be in the user’s typical workflow. Furthermore, gaze tracking
requires the user’s eyes to be open. In the same vein, keystroke
analysis requires the user to type on the keyboard. For its
part, the pulse-response biometric needs the user to complete
an electrical circuit by touching conductive implements with
both hands. With all these systems, if the user fails to behave
in the required manner, the likely outcome is a false positive.
In contrast, PoPa is more forgiving in such cases. Fur-
thermore, PoPa does not rely on specific user actions, unlike
implicit behavioral requirements of gaze tracking, keystroke
analysis or pulse response. Instead, PoPa is based merely
on user’s physical presence. It monitors seated pressure distri-
bution regardless of whether the user faces the workstation,
touches the keyboard with both hands, is currently typing,
or keeps eyes open. The only requirement for collection of
posture pattern data is that the user must be seated in the
chair. We believe that this makes PoPa a good candidate for
both continuous authentication and de-authentication.
V. ADVERSARIAL MODEL & ATTACKS
PoPa biometric focuses on protecting against insider
threats. We are particularly concerned with aforementioned
Lunchtime Attacks whereby the adversary steps in to access
a co-worker’s computer after the latter walks away. Insider
threats are not limited to such attacks, and might include
scenarios ranging from a disgruntled employee staying after
hours to sabotage a colleague, to the trivial case of a user
deliberately giving access to a co-worker. In all scenarios,
the adversary “wins” by gaining access to secure log-in or
application sessions.
We assume that the original user provides authentic log-in
credentials at session initiation time. However, the same user
neglects to log-out before physically leaving the workplace.
Once the original user leaves, the adversary approaches the
computer, accesses secure log-in sessions and performs some
actions, e.g., copy or erase sensitive files, read or send private
email. Such attacks are particularly dangerous since they orig-
inate from valid and logged-in user accounts. Also, it might
be very difficult for the victim to repudiate the adversary’s
actions.
Insider attacks are unfortunately quite commonplace. in fact,
they account for about 28% of all electronic crimes in industry
[14]. This includes some high-publicity attacks, such as the
infamous 2014 Sony hack [19].
We consider two types of insider adversaries: casual and
determined. In both cases, the adversary is aware of PoPa’s
use and presence. The adversary is considered successful if
it manages to circumvent the system, either by physically
imitating the victim’s pressure patterns, or by constructing
an accurate model (replica) that does the same. We assume
that the adversary cannot disable the system, or interfere with
its correct operation through physical sabotage, since such
manipulation would leave traces.
The casual adversary aims to subvert PoPa through behav-
ioral imitation of the victim user’s posture patterns. We assume
that this adversary is familiar with the habits and schedule of
the victim, and has physical access to the victim’s workplace.
Success of the casual adversary relies on the discriminating
power of the system. In our prototype design (discussed
later), posture pattern data is aggregated and evaluated against
the previously constructed profile every 10 seconds. Even in
the unrealistically ideal scenario where the casual adversary
instantly appears in the victim’s chair immediately after the
victim walks away, only 10 seconds would remain to perform
any attack. (In our experimental office setting, this attack time
window is substantially shorter, ≈2-to-4 seconds, since it takes
3-to-4 seconds for the victim to leave and about as long for the
adversary to enter and sit down.) After that, posture data would
be flagged as incorrect, the victim would be de-authenticated,
i.e., all active secure sessions would be terminated.
The determined adversary seeks to defeat the system by
fabricating a physical model of the victim user. We assume
that this adversary has access to the exact sensor data of
the victim, as well as precise measurements of the victim’s
posterior and lower back. This data might be obtained if the
adversary manages to previously trick the victim to sit (for
a sufficiently long period) in a staged chair instrumented the
same way as the victim’s.
A perfect mold or cast of the victim with the correct pressure
distribution would circumvent PoPa. However, creation and
deployment of such a mold is not trivial. The determined
adversary would have to create (perhaps using a 3D printer) a
bulky and heavy object that accurately replicates the victim’s
posterior as well as lower back and weighs enough to exert the
necessary pressure upon the instrumented chair, in the right
places. Physically and logistically, deploying the mold onto
the victim’s chair is burdensome and likely to be detected
by extraneous means, e.g., the adversary might be seen by
others, or recorded by a security camera, while lugging the
conspicuous mold.
However, we recognize that a mold is not the only way
to subvert PoPa. We conjecture that a more effective and
discrete approach is to use a set of strategically placed
hydraulic or pneumatic contraptions, each calibrated to exert
an accurate amount of pressure on each sensor on the victim’s
chair. This kind of precision is difficult to achieve and, unlike
a monolithic mold, placing the entire set of contraptions onto
the chair at the same time is also quite hard. All in all, we
consider this attack to be quite improbable and close to the
realm of “Mission: Impossible”.
VI. COMPARISON OF CONTINUOUS AUTHENTICATION
TECHNIQUES
This section provides a comparison of five modern im-
plementations of continuous authentication techniques, in the
context of our design goals presented in Section III-E. We
assume that systems would be deployed in a medium-sized
office setting with about 50 employees. We included: gaze
tracking, pulse-response, wrist movement (ZEBRA), keystroke
dynamics and PoPa. Each system is evaluated separately
below and a summary is reflected in Table I.
A. Gaze Tracking
We use the method proposed by Eberz, et. al [7] which
describes a system for continuous authentication based on the
Eye Movements biometric, which tracks user’s gaze through-
out a typical workday.
Universality is (mostly) satisfied since it is reasonable to
assume that a typical computer user has both eyes unobstructed
by dark glasses or severe cataracts. However, as mentioned
earlier, activities [A2], [A5] and [A8] disrupt gaze tracking
and are likely to result in unnecessary de-authentication. [A4]
[A6] and [A7] might result produce the same outcome.
Uniqueness was demonstrated experimentally by the con-
struction of a classifier that distinguished among 30 enrolled
subjects with equal error rate of 3.98%.
Permanence is a challenge for gaze tracking. User data relies
on many environmental variables, such as overall brightness
of the area, as well as on user-specific variables, such as user’s
overall level of fatigue. Such confounding variables make gaze
tracking a somewhat ephemeral measure.
Unobtrusiveness is mostly achieved since gaze tracking
passively collects eye movement data and does not require
any special user input from the user as long as she is facing
the gaze tracking device.
Circumvention Difficulty is framed in the context of an
insider adversary attempting a lunchtime attack. A given user’s
gaze tracking pattern cannot be imitated by another with any
degree of reliability.
Collectability is achieved by the definition of 21 unique
features of the human eye gazing at a computer screen. These
features are discretized and quantitatively evaluated.
Cost Effectiveness represents another challenge. While this
biometric appears to have high distinguishing power, based on
difficulty to circumvent, permanence and uniqueness, high-
fidelity, high-frame-rate cameras used in the prototype im-
plementation are quite expensive for large-scale deployment.
The original prototype used the SenseMotoric Instruments
(SMI) RED 500Hz gaze-tracking camera. While RED500
is no longer available, SMI has a range of gaze-tracking
techniques that range from $2,000 to $5,000 per unit4. Even
with a generous reduction of price for ordering high fidelity
cameras in bulk, we estimate that the cost for instrumenting
50 workstations to use a gaze tracking system would be on
the order of $100, 000.
B. Pulse-Response
Rasmussen, et. al [16] proposed a biometric technique for
continuous user authentication based on the human body’s
unique response to an electrical pulse. A user holds two diodes
(one in each hand) a weak electrical current (1V) is passed
through and measured.
Universality is satisfied since the only requirement for users
is to have two hands.
Uniqueness is provided using a classifier that matches pulse-
response data to samples taken immediately beforehand, with
nearly 100% accuracy.
Permanence is experimentally asserted to be very strong.
Impedance was measured several times over several days, and
measurements were classified with the accuracy nearing 100%.
Unobtrusiveness is fair, though not as good as that of gaze
tracking, since for measurement purposes, the user needs to
touch two conductive surfaces with both hands. This imposes
a small burden on the user and requires slight behavior modi-
fication. (Unless the user is constantly typing with both hands
touching a conductive keyboard, or one hand on keyboard and
the other – on the mouse.) Circumvention Difficulty is achieved
since it is highly improbable for the adversary to mimic
someone else’s impedance, due to experimentally confirmed
strong uniqueness and permanence features.
Collectability is easily obtained, albeit additional instru-
mentation is needed, e.g., conductive keyboards, mice and
potentially other implements.
Cost Effectiveness of pulse-response is unknown. Although
Rasmussen et al. mention possible realizations, no realistic
prototype exists. Thus, it is impossible to estimate costs.
4see: https://www.smivision.com
C. Wrist Movements (ZEBRA)
ZEBRA is a continuous authentication technique that relies
on a wristband equipped with an accelerometer, gyroscope and
radio to measure user’s dominant wrist movements [12].
Universality is satisfied since data collection requires only
that the users have a dominant wrist, and wear the wristband
on it.
Uniqueness is provided since it is claimed that ZEBRA can
identify: (1) a genuine user with 85% accuracy, within 11
seconds. and (2) an adversary, within 50 seconds.
Circumvention Difficulty is dubious in light of recent attacks
that violate ZEBRA’s Uniqueness features.
Permanence is demonstrated by the classifier’s ability to
identify the correct user (within 11 seconds with 85% accu-
racy). This holds for user sessions occurring several days apart.
Unobtrusiveness is double-sided: on one hand, user behavior
is mostly unmodified for the purpose of authentication; on the
other hand, the user is burdened with wearing an additional
device.
Collectability is satisfied since wrist movement data is easily
collected via gyroscope and accelerometer and communicated
over Bluetooth.
Cost Effectiveness is relatively good. Inexpensive fitness-
style bracelets (equipped with an accelerometer, gyroscope,
and Bluetooth) are available on the market at about $100 per
unit5, making for a total of $5, 000 to instrument a medium-
size (50−-person) office.
D. Keystroke Dynamics
Many continuous authentication systems based on keystroke
dynamics have been proposed. We refer to [2] as a represen-
tative example.
Universality is satisfied since the use of a keyboard is
routine in interacting with a computer. Touch-screen devices
are an exception, though they are not very common in office
settings.
Uniqueness of keystroke dynamics is tightly related with its
Circumvention Difficulty. Working systems have been devel-
oped that exhibit lower than 0.01% false negative rates [2].
Permanence is quite weak since a given user’s keystroke
dynamics can change significantly over the course of a single
session, based on specific actions, e.g., typing with both hands
or one (pecking). User fatigue is another factor negatively
influencing permanence.
Unobtrusiveness is quite good, as long as the user keeps
typing naturally. However, except for a few jobs that require
constant typing, most office-setting users do not engage in
continuous typing throughout a typical workday. In particular,
[A2]–[A8] preclude data collection and would likely result in
erroneous de-authentication.
Collectability of keystroke dynamics is trivial and excellent,
since the biometric itself is defined in the context of the pre-
existing human-computer interaction.
5see: https://www.fitbit.com
Cost-Effectiveness is ideal. Because no hardware instrumen-
tation is needed (only software support), systems based on
keystroke dynamics are clearly the most cost-effective of all
methods we consider.
E. PoPa
We finally assess the proposd PoPa techniques which
attains continuous authentication based on the posture-pattern
biometric.
Universality is very good, as the only user requirement is to
be seated, which (perhaps sadly) accounts for most of a typical
office user’s workday and thus applies to the overwhelming
majority of users. It also correctly functions in cases [A1]–
[A9], i.e., users are not unnecessarily de-authenticated.
Uniqueness is quite high, based on our results (see below)
that demonstrate 91% accuracy of user identification using
measurements collected from individual users over several
days.
Permanence is, for now, the weak point of PoPa. As
discussed in Section VIII, based on our initial experiments,
it is not satisfactory. However, we believe that further longer-
term studies might change this result.
Unobtrusiveness is easily achieved due to PoPa passively
collecting data while the user is seated, and requires no
behavior modification or any other burden.
Circumvention Difficulty is excellent, based on our discus-
sion in Section V. This is clearly the case for the casual
adversary, given our 0.33% false positive rate for all subjects.
We also argue that the burden and cost of creating and
deploying a replica in the case of the determined adversary
makes the attack impractical.
Collectability is very easy: data is obtained using a standard
office chair instrumented with 16 ultra-thin force-resistive
pressure sensors, which are used to discretize and collect
posture pattern data.
Cost-effectiveness was one of our key design goals and we
believe that it is fairly good. All equipment necessary for
us to intrument a single office chair prototype costed $275.
However, scale substantially drives down the price: based
on cost estimates from hardware providers, instrumenting 50
office chairs would cost $150 per unit, for a total of $7, 500.
Additionally, the components are easy to acquire. The a401
sensors were purchased from Tekscan6, and the remaning
components: the Arduino, breadboard and jumper wires, can
be found at any consumer electronics store7.
VII. METHODOLOGY
This section describes our initial PoPa prototype design,
experimental setup, procedures, subject parameters as well as
classifiers used for data analysis.
A. Prototype Design
To demonstrate viability and facilitate ease of experimenta-
tion, we built the PoPa prototype by modifying a standard
6See: http://tekscan.com for more information and pricing.
7see:http://www.frys.com for pricing
inexpensive office chair with commodity (off-the-shelf) sensor
components. Figure 1(a) shows the prototype chair, and Figure
1(b) focuses on the placement of sensors across the seat and
back of the chair. Our sensor placement was guided by the
experience of Mutlu et al. [15].
The prototype consists of three components:
1) One 2003/2004 Hon Mid-Back Task Chair.8
2) Sixteen (16) Tekscan Flexiforce A401 Large Force Sens-
ing Resistors.6 The recommended circuit for pressure data
acquisition is illustrated in Figure 2.
3) Two Arduino 101 modules9, one of which is connected to
6 A401 resistors, as shown in Figure 3. The other module
is connected to the remaining 10 sensors in a similar
configuration, augmented with an analog multiplexer in
its 6-th analog port, in order to support the use of 10
sensor inputs.
Acquired measurements are sent from the Arduino to a com-
modity desktop PC for collection and evaluation. Arduinos are
connected to the desktop via USB cables. Obviously, in a real
office setting, having wires running between the chair and the
computer would be highly undesirable. We expect that either
Bluetooth or WiFi would be used instead.
As mentioned earlier in the paper, our total instrumentation
cost of $275 was for the initial single-chair prototype, created
to demonstrate feasibility and for testing via user experiments.
For a medium-size office with 50 chairs, the price can be
cut significantly, to approximately $150 per instrumented chair
due to the reduced cost of bulk ordering the Tekscan A4016.
B. Data Collection Procedure
To collect data in a realistic setting, rather than bringing sub-
jects to an unfamiliar office and encountering complications
cited by Yamada, et. al [22] in collecting posture data in a lab
setting, we brought the prototype instrumented chair to the
subjects’ workplace. Each subject was briefed on the nature
of the experiment, and was asked to sit naturally. Subjects
allowed us to swap out their office chair with the prototype,
and continued their normal work activities while sitting on
the latter. We collected posture data in rounds of 10 minutes
per subject. 17 subjects participated in two collection sessions
over the course of several days. and 13 subjects participated
in a single session only. We sampled subjects in order to
accommodate typical day-to-day fluctuations in mood and
posture, e.g., one session in the morning, and the other –
shortly after lunch, on a different day.
A total of 30 subjects were recruited primarily from the
graduate student population of a large public university. Be-
cause of this, overwhelming majority (27 out of 30) were
between the ages of 22 and 30, while the the remaining 3
were somewhat older faculty and staff. The subjects’ gender
break-down was: 10 female and 20 male.
Finally, despite its somewhat ungainly appearance (as shown
in Figure 1), the prototype chair is rather comfortable for
8See https://www.hon.com.
9See https://www.arduino.cc/en/Main/ArduinoBoard101.
TABLE I: Comparison of Continuous Authentication Systems
System Universal Unique Permanent Unobtrusive Difficult to Circumvent Collectible Cost per unit
PoPa ! ! WEAK ! ! ! $150
Gaze Tracking ! ! X ! ! ! $2K − $5K
Pulse-response ! ! ! ! ! ! Unknown
ZEBRA ! ! ! X X ! $100
Keystroke Dynamics ! ! ! ! ! ! Free
Fig. 1: The PoPa prototype chair: (a) as seen by user, and (b) uncovered seat-bottom sensor placements.
sitting and none of the subjects expressed any unease or
discomfort during the data collection phase.
C. Features
We collected data in the form of 1, 200 sample time-series
reflecting the force exerted on each of the 16 pressure sensors
captured each 0.5 seconds over a 10-minute session, for a total
of 19, 200 samples per subject, per session. Figure 4 shows
an example of pressure data collected from a single sensor
over the course of a single session. Note that the subject’s
posture changes part-way through the session. The subject then
remains in the new posture for several minutes, and later shifts
again to a posture similar to the first.
For continuous authentication, we treat the first 5 minutes
of each session as a training phase, and evaluate the subject
on the next 10 seconds. If that data is accepted as valid, it is
included in the training set for the next 10 second evaluation
window.
D. Classification Algorithm
Since we are dealing with a fairly commonplace time series
clustering problem, there are many well-known candidate
techniques. We compared three most popular classification
algorithms to determine the one that provides the best results.
Random Forest (RF): we found that it consistently yields
the best results. It produces precise, accurate results, closely
clustered for all subjects. Both false negative and false positive
rates are acceptably low in cross-validation of user data, as
discussed in more detail below.
K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN): we tested the KNN classifier for
k = 1, 3 and 5 using euclidean distance. KNN is a simple lazy
classifier that is quite effective in many settings. However, for
Fig. 2: Recommended circuit for the Tekscan Flexiforce A401
sensor.
our specific classification needs, it did not perform as well as
RF.
Support Vector Machine (SVM): For each subject, we trained
a single binary classifier in a one-against-one case. The final
prediction is determined by voting. While SVM provided
extremely consistent and highly accurate results for some
users, it did not perform as well RF, on average. It also had a
few outliers with unacceptably high false positive rates.
VIII. RESULTS
We present results for two classifiers: one for identification
and the other – for authentication. The former is based
on RF and provides verification of a one-to-n match of a
sample of a known user against every sample in a database.
The authentication classifier is also RF-based and provides
verification of a one-to-one match of a sample of unknown
origin against that of a single known user.
We divide the results into two parts: (1) those from a single
test set, which show distinguishing capabilities of PoPa, and
(2) those from applying the classifier to data sampled over
time across multiple user sessions. The latter are used to test
permanence of our PoPa prototype.
Identification is a classification problem across many
classes. Our RF classifier is ideal for this – it achieves, on
average, 91.0% true positive rate, as shown in Figure 5. We
also achieve average false positive rate of 0.33%, as shown
in Figure 6, and 8.68% average false negative rate, shown in
Figure 7.
Fig. 3: Fritzing diagram for the 6-sensor Arduino.
Fig. 4: Raw sensor data for demonstrating a posture shift.
As results indicate, permanence is problematic in our pro-
totype. When evaluating user data across multiple sessions,
the RF classifier yielded only a 22% true positive rate, a
false positive rate of 5.2%, and a 72.7% false negative rate.
However, we do not view this as a major weakness of either
PoPa or its initial prototype. Instead, we consider this to be
a motivation for a more in-depth longitudinal study.
Fig. 5: Identification classifier results: True Positive Rate for each subject is obtained by performing 10 times stratified 10-fold cross-
validation.
Fig. 6: False Positive Rate for Random Forest cross-validation on all subject data.
IX. DISCUSSION
We now assess PoPa in the context of design goals for an
ideal de-authentication system outlined in Section III.
PoPa was designed with the emphasis on minimal extra
components and monetary cost. The use of an instrumented
chair does require specialized hardware. However, it does not
impose any behavioral requirements on the user. Furthermore,
the per-unit cost of $150 (at scale of about 50) is reasonable
in the context of other posture-based techniques, which can
easily cost thousands of dollars, e.g., [15].
We claim that maximal user transparency is achieved by
PoPa because of the ubiquitous nature of sitting in office
or workplace settings. In fact, over 70% of the workforce in
a traditional office setting spend upwards of 6 hours a day
seated [20]. Enrollment, authentication and de-authentication
phases of PoPa all occur transparently while the user is seated
and engaged in normal workflow activities. Because of this,
there are no behavioral modifications required from the user
to participate in PoPa and no need for modifying everyday
activities.
Quick detection of activities requiring de-authentication is
trivial in PoPa. A user who engages in any activity covered by
[A9] is de-authenticated as soon as a single collection window
passes. Though in the initial prototype implementation this
window was set to 10 seconds, it can be adjusted up or down.
As evidenced by the average 91.0% rate of accuracy of user
identification, false positives would only occur in exceptional
circumstances, which satisfies the minimal insult rate design
goal. This holds during most typical office activities [A1-
A7] that are typically performed while the users is seated.
However, if a user leaves the chair to grab something nearby
[A8] and spends over 10 seconds away, potentially erroneous
Fig. 7: False Negative rate for Random Forest cross-validation on all subject data.
de-authentication can occur.
PoPa prototype achieves a very low average false negative
rate of 0.33%. Even if a casual adversary succeeds once,
the probability of two successive successful impersonations is
only 0.11%. We believe that this satisfies the goal of having
a minimal fraud rate.
A. Ethical Concerns
Unfortunately, the use of PoPa for de-authentication
system also triggers potentially negative implications for
user privacy. Unlike traditional single-session authentication
techniques, PoPa is inherently tied to the user’s physical
presence. This has the unintended consequence of leaking
whether or not the user is physically at the office or desk. This
information could be used by the unscrupulous management
to micro-manage and/or audit the time an employee spends at
the workstation, the frequency with which they get up, how
long they are gone, and other very personal details.
This type of privacy leakage is not unique to PoPa.
Indeed, it is common to most continuous authentication and
de-authentication methods. In general, details corresponding
to each time when the user quits acting in the expected
manner are leaked. (For example, with keystroke dynamics,
information is leaked whenever the user stops typing.) We
certainly do not recommend or endorse the use of PoPa in
such ethically dubious ways.
All experiments described in this paper were duly au-
thorized by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the
authors’ employer, well ahead of the actual commencement
of the study. The level of review was: Exempt, Category II.
No sensitive data was collected during the experiments and
minimal identifying information was retained. In particular, no
subject names, phone numbers or other personally identifying
information (PII) was collected. All obtained data was stored
pseudonymously.
X. FUTURE WORK
There are several directions for future work.
First, as mentioned above, our initial permanence results are
weak. We plan to conduct a larger-scale, longer-term (longitu-
dinal) study, obtaining multiple measurement sessions from
each subject. This would yield more concrete permanence
results and lead to a better understanding of the posture pattern
biometric as a whole.
Second, we intend to evaluate accuracy of PoPa in its
typical use-case. For this field study, we intend to have the
subjects replace their office chair with our prototype for an
entire workday. We would use this data to obtain the rate of
both false negatives and positivies, throughout the day, as well
as measure associated user burden.
Next, we plan to evaluate attack vectors outlined in section
V, starting with a casual adversary. This will entail recruiting
pairs of subjects with similar physical characteristics, and
training them to impersonate each other’s posture patterns.
Finally, we explore the attacks by a determined adversary.
For this we need to construct a contraption that imitates the
victim’s posture pattern.
XI. CONCLUSION
In summary, this paper proposed and described a new
biometric – PoPa– based on seated posture patterns. We built
and experimented with a prototype implementation of PoPa.
Furthermore, experimental results show that posture pattern
biometric captures a unique combination of physiological and
behavioral traits. We found that users can be identified with,
on average, 91% accuracy from a population of 30. We
also believe that it is infeasible for a casual adversary to
circumvent PoPa by impersonation of the victim’s posture
patterns. We also argue that physical and logistical burdens
of fabricating and deploying an accurate mold (replica) of
the victim’s relevant body parts make circumvention very
challenging even for the determined adversary. Finally, we
provided a thorough comparison of several prominent modern
biometric-based techniques for continuous authentication.
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